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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, appellants H.C. 
Massey and Betty P. Massey, will collectively be referred to herein as "Masseys"' the 
appellees Kenneth A. Griffiths, BKB, L.L.C., and 12 x 12, L.L.C., will collectively be 
referred to herein as "Griffiths' Parties," and appellees Aaron B. Buttars, Brenda L. 
Buttars, and Adele B. Lewis, will collectively be referred to herein as "Buttars' Parties." 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Griffiths' Parties agree with the Masseys' statement of jurisdiction of this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: WHETHER A TAX SALE TAKES PRIORITY 
OVER PROPERTY CLAIMED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESENCE. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: The Griffiths' Parties agree with the 
Masseys' statement of applicable standard of appellate review of this case. 
RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE AND OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). Summary judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition Below 
This case involved an action by the Masseys for quiet title, trespass and waste to 
real property ("disputed property") which was owned and occupied by the appellees and 
their predecessors in interest at all material times herein. The Masseys claim to the 
disputed property was founded upon certain tax deeds ("Tax Deeds") which they 
acquired from Weber County. 
Prior to the scheduled trial of the case, the appellees filed motions for summary 
judgment. The Masseys opposed these motions. Based upon these motions, the trial 
court entered its Ruling Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment ("Conditional 
Ruling"), a copy of which is included in the Addendum attached to Appellant's Brief On 
Certiorari. The Conditional Ruling in essence set forth the trial court's legal conclusions 
and outlined certain facts that would need to be established for the Masseys to prevail at 
trial. 
Following the trial court's issuance of its Conditional Ruling, the parties 
participated in a telephone conference with the trial court. During the course of that 
telephone conference, the Masseys' counsel made certain admissions and stipulations as 
to facts of the case. The parties and the trial court determined that these admissions and 
stipulations, when combined with the trial court's legal conclusions contained in its 
Conditional Ruling, effectively disposed of the case. 
Although the conclusions reached in the telephone conference disposed of the 
Masseys' claims, fmalization of the boundary lines between the appellees' property 
2 
needed to be addressed. It was determined that the trial court would enter Findings Of 
Fact and Conclusions Of Law along with an order which formalized the boundary lines 
between the appellees' parcels of property. No objections were filed by Masseys to the 
findings, conclusions and order. 
The Masseys thereafter appealed this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Masseys then petitioned this 
Court for certiorari. This Court granted certiorari, but limited the issue to whether a tax 
sale takes priority over property claimed under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Masseys received four tax deeds from Weber County. Two of the tax 
deeds were conveyed on June 12, 1986 and the other two tax deeds were conveyed on 
June 8, 1992. (R. 989-991) The property purportedly conveyed by the Tax Deeds is the 
disputed property which is involved in this matter. 
2. The disputed property was occupied in its entirety by the appellees and 
their predecessors in interest up to long established boundary lines at all material times 
herein, and the appellees and their predecessors in interest paid their property taxes 
related to the disputed property at all material times herein. (R. 1014) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue in this case is whether a tax sale takes priority over property claimed 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Griffiths' Parties assert the answer 
to this issue depends on whether the boundary was agreed upon (boundary by 
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acquiescence) prior the date of the tax sale. If the boundary is agreed to, and taxes are 
paid on the agreed upon property, then there cannot be a valid tax sale. 
The Masseys contend the trial court erred because the Masseys were entitled to 
ownership of the disputed property by virtue of the Tax Deeds they received from Weber 
County. It is uncontested, however, that appellees and their predecessors in interest 
occupied the disputed property up to and including certain boundary lines that have 
existed at all material times herein. The occupation by the appellees and their 
predecessors in interest existed both before and after the Tax Deeds were issued. 
Moreover, there is also no dispute that appellees and their predecessors in interest have 
paid their property taxes related to the disputed property in connection with the tax 
notices they regularly received from Weber County, which tax notices covered the 
disputed real property legally described in the county records, including, at the very least, 
the most substantial portion of the disputed property. 
Based upon the concessions of Masseys' counsel, the trial court determined that 
the disputed property had been occupied in its entirety by appellees and their 
predecessors in interest for over twenty years. The trial court further determined that 
appellees and their predecessors in interest had paid the property taxes on the disputed 
property as described in their recorded deeds and in the related tax notices, and that to the 
extent the appellees had occupied land that was not part of the deeds' legal descriptions, 
that such land should be included as part as appellees' property pursuant to the legal 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. It is important to note that there is no disputed 
property on which taxes have not completely been paid. Regardless of whether the 
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legally described or agreed upon boundary is used, taxes were paid by at least one of the 
appellees on all of the disputed property. The Masseys have not established any parcel 
upon which taxes have not been paid. 
Accordingly, the trial court concluded, "If Weber County issues tax deeds on 
property upon which taxes have always been paid on record title and which boundaries 
have been changed from the recorded title by the concept of boundaries by acquiescence, 
then those tax deeds on such property are null and void as to any person now holding an 
otherwise legitimate title by recorded conveyance, including the modified boundary by 
acquiescence." (R. 964) The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's reasoning and 
conclusion. 
As it is uncontested that the boundary line in this case was in place well before the 
tax sale, and as it is uncontested that taxes have always been fully and timely paid for at 
all material times herein, the tax sale was not valid because Weber County could not have 
conveyed valid tax deeds to the Masseys. 
ARGUMENT 
Validity Of Tax Sale 
The issue in this case is whether is whether a tax sale takes priority over property 
claimed under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Griffiths' Parties assert 
the answer to this issue depends on whether the agreed upon boundary (boundary by 
acquiescence) was in effect prior to the date of the tax sale. If the boundary is agreed 
upon, and taxes are paid on the agreed upon parcel, then there cannot be a valid tax sale 
of that property. 
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The Masseys argue that the tax sales extinguished all prior ownership claims to the 
property acquired by the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence because tax titles are 
entitled to a high degree of protection under Utah law. The Masseys' argument assumes, 
however, that the tax sales were valid in the first place. 
At a telephone conference which was held with the trial judge in this matter on 
February 24, 2004, the Masseys' counsel stated, "Let me say, your honor, that I do not 
have any evidence that would suggest that the [appellees] have not paid taxes on the tax 
notices that have been sent to them over the years, nor do I have any evidence that there 
is any parcel of property at issue here that hasn't been occupied by the [appellees] over 
the years." (R. 1014 at pgs. 3-4) 
Under Utah law and other relevant law, lawful tax sale proceedings can only be 
based upon a failure to pay the taxes assessed against the property sold, and no validity 
attaches to any tax sale concerning property for which the taxes have been paid and that 
never became delinquent. Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 1A P.2d 1184, 1189 
(Utah 1938); Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1946); Thirteenth South Ltd. v. 
Summit Village Inc., 866 P.2d 257, 259 (Nev. 1993). Utah law further provides that a 
person claiming title to real property by reason of a tax deed is chargeable with notice of 
and takes subject to the full record chain of title. Hayes, supra, at 784; Utah Recording 
Act, UCA§ 57-3-21(1). 
The Masseys have conceded that taxes were paid by appellees and their 
predecessors in interest on the most substantial portion of the disputed property 
legally described in appellees' deeds. The Masseys, however, have raised an issue as 
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to whether the legal descriptions set forth in the record title documents fully describe 
all of the disputed property. In this regard, the trial court properly resolved this issue 
by its application of the legal doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. It is significant 
to note, however, that even without the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, there 
is no evidence that taxes were not paid on all of the disputed property. This is so 
because the appellees paid their taxes at all material times herein, and the boundary 
line between their properties would have no impact on whether taxes were paid on 
the entire disputed property. 
Boundary by acquiescence is a long established doctrine in Utah. Holmes v. 
Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009, 1014 (1906). In Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App. 
145, 24 P.3d 997 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), this Court evaluated the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence in the tax deed context, and rejected the argument that appellants make here 
that purchasers of tax deeds take their property free and clear of acquiesced boundary lines. 
After noting that "easements and restrictive covenants survive a tax sale/' because a property 
owner does not hold title to or pay taxes on an easement, this Court in Mason held: 
That same analysis applies to the present case. Here, the trial court found 
that a boundary by acquiescence claim was established as early as 1949, 
and Tax Deed Defendants' predecessors in interest became owners of the 
adjoining land much later. Accordingly, Tax Deed Defendants' tax deeds did 
not extinguish the preexisting boundary by acquiescence claim. To hold 
otherwise would contravene the Fifth Amendment's protection against 
taking of property without due process of law... Accordingly, Tax Deed 
Defendants' deed did not convey title free and clear of the preexisting 
boundary by acquiescence, and the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment. . . (emphasis added.) 
Id. at 1003. 
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It is clear that all taxes assessed against appellees' property were paid and were 
never delinquent. As such, Weber County had nothing to sell or convey to the Masseys 
by means of the Tax Deeds. Consequently, a tax sale concerning the disputed property 
was neither appropriate nor valid. The court of appeal's affirmance of the trial court's 
ruling was correct. 
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, the Tax Deeds were somehow valid, the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence precludes the Masseys from acquiring any of the 
disputed property herein. While counsel for the Griffiths' Parties has been unable to 
locate any Utah case law which is dispositive of the issue in this case, the Florida 
Supreme Court has evaluated the boundary by acquiescence/tax deed issue. 
In Euse v. Gibbs, 49 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1951), the Florida Supreme Court reversed a 
trial court's decision which indicated an agreed upon fence (boundary) line was 
extinguished when a tax deed that described the true boundary rather than the agreed 
upon boundary was issued. 
The Euse case involved two adjacent 20-acre parcels of real property. In 1931, the 
owners of these two parcels agreed that an existing fence line would fix the boundary line 
between the properties. Notably, the fence line fixed by common consent as the 
boundary line was some 64 feet west of the true line between the parties. The boundary 
line agreement consequently enlarged the east parcel by 64 feet. The record in Euse 
further indicated that at all material times, the property owner of the east parcel remained 
in the actual possession of the strip of land lying between the fence line and the true line, 
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and that he claimed the same as his own. As such, the line agreed upon between the 
parties became established as the true line by acquiescence and recognition. 
Sometime after 1938, the west tract of land reverted to the State of Florida for 
non-payment of taxes. In 1941, a tax deed was issued on the west property. In 1947, a 
new owner purchased the west tract. This new owner of the west parcel thereafter 
brought an action requesting that the trial court decree that the east parcel owner had no 
interest in the strip of property and that the east property owner be enjoined from 
interfering with or molesting the west property owner in the enjoyment, occupation and 
use thereof. 
Using reasoning similar to that set forth by the Masseys herein, in Euce, the trial 
court in essence concluded that when the tax deed to the west tract issued in 1941, it cut 
off the east parcel's owner's title to the strip of land he had acquired and occupied, and 
that the tax deed vested in the west parcel owner a new, paramount and independent title 
from the State of Florida to the west tract owner of the entire 20-acre tract. The east 
property owner appealed from the trial court's ruling. 
Upon review, the Florida Supreme Court found substantial evidence in the record 
that the parties had agreed by both acquiescence and recognition that the fence line 
should constitute the true line between the properties. The Florida Court then stated, "We 
cannot agree with the finding of the trial court that [the east property owner] lost title to 
the strip of land in controversy by virtue of the issuance of the tax deed in 1941...." 
The Euse court found that, "The original parties having reached an agreement that 
the fence line should constitute the true line, the disputed strip of land west of the true 
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line, but east of the fence, became for all purposes part of the 20-acre tract lying east of 
the true line, regardless of the fact that the description of such strip of land was not 
contained in the description [of the original deed describing the east property]." The 
Euse court quoted from a California decision which stated, "[T]he division line when thus 
established attaches itself to the deeds of the respective parties and simply defines, not 
adds to, the lands described in the deeds, and, if more is thus given to one than the calls 
of his deed actually require, he holds the excess by the same tenure that he holds the main 
body of his land." Prince v. De Reyes, 161 Ca. 484, 119 P. 893, 894 (1911). 
The Euse concluded by stating: 
It is plain from the evidence that [the east property owner] paid taxes 
on the east 20-acre tract assessed each year according to the description in 
the [original east property deed]. The boundary line fixed by agreement of 
the parties attached itself to the land described in the [original east property 
deed] and under such circumstances the payment of taxes assessed against 
the east 20-acre tract in accordance with the description contained in the 
[original east property deed] became a payment of taxes on the entire tract 
of land in possession of [the east property owner] under the deed and 
agreement between the parties. 
So it is while in 1941 the legal title to the westerly 20-acre tract of 
owned by the [west property owner] may have been cut off and 
extinguished by virtue of the issuance of the tax deed, the issuance of the 
tax deed had no effect upon the strip of land lying east of the fence which 
theretofore had been established as the boundary line by the parties. This 
strip of land was and remained part of the east 20-acre parcel which was 
owned by the [east parcel property owner] and as to which taxes had been 
regularly paid. Thus it was not affected by the tax deed proceedings 
instituted against the west 20-acre tract and hence the provisions of 
[Florida's adverse possession statutes] were not applicable. Neither were 
[additional Florida adverse possession] statutes applicable, for the suit by 
[the west parcel land owner] against the [east parcel land owner], was not, 
in legal effect, a suit against a person in adverse possession as against or 
claiming the right of possession by virtue of the issuance of a tax deed 
creating a new and independent title, but was a suit by a tax deed claimant 
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against a person lawfully in possession of his own property which he had 
derived by deed and agreement fixing the boundary line of such property-
property which, in legal effect, was not covered by the description in the 
tax deed. 
The Euse case is factual similar to the case at hand, and should be persuasive 
authority for this Court. As in Euse, in this case there is an old fence which marked the 
boundary line associated with the disputed property. Also as in Euse, in this case the 
appellees occupied the land up to the boundary line (fence). The difference between the 
case at and Euce is, however, that in Euce there was actually some property upon which 
taxes had not been paid. 
As mentioned above, during a trial court telephone conference which was held in 
this matter on February 24, 2004, the Masseys' counsel stated, "Let me say, your honor, 
that I do not have any evidence that would suggest that the [appellees] have not paid 
taxes on the tax notices that have been sent to them over the years, nor do I have any 
evidence that there is any parcel of property at issue here that hasn't been occupied by the 
[appellees] over the years." (R. 1014 at pgs. 3-4) 
As is explained in Euse, when there is an agreed upon boundary line, all property 
up to that boundary line (even including property that may not be described in the deed to 
the property) becomes titled in the name of the person who occupies and possesses that 
property. Moreover, as explained in Euse, all taxes paid in connection with the boundary 
arrangement not only count toward the deeded property, but also cover any property that 
falls within the property covered by the boundary agreement. 
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Applying the foregoing reasoning and analysis to the case at hand establishes that 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the appellees held title to the disputed 
property they possessed and occupied. When appellees paid taxes, they paid taxes on all 
of the disputed property they owed and occupied. As such, Weber County had no 
authority to issue the Masseys' tax deeds because taxes had always been paid on all on 
the described and agreed upon property. 
Lack Of Due Process 
The Masseys' assertions that appellees had notice of the Masseys' claims to the 
disputed property are not true. There are no facts or evidence establishing that appellees 
were provided with any actual or constructive notice that their real property was subject, 
in whole or in part, to the county's erroneous tax foreclosure. In fact, new parcel 
numbers were assigned by Weber County to the portions of the disputed property 
described in the Tax Deeds. 
Because new parcel numbers were assigned, a parcel number search in the county 
records would not and did not reveal any conflict. Any and all subsequent conveyances 
and tax notices were simply based on the distinct parcel numbers, with no indication 
provided or available to appellees that any potential conflict existed or that a tax sale had 
even occurred. 
The appellees had no notice or knowledge of the Masseys' claim to the disputed 
property or that their property ownership was being subjected to a tax dispute or an 
erroneous sale. When this lack of notice is combined with the appellees' consistent 
occupancy and use of the disputed property, it would be a violation of the appellees' due 
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process rights to hold that the subject tax sales divested them of their ownership, 
especially where appellees had no notice or opportunity to be heard. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and legal authority, the trial court ruled properly 
and prudently on all matters before it and the trial court's ruling was properly affirmed by 
the Utah Court Of Appeals. As such, the underlying ruling of the court of appeals should 
be affirmed without exception. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1^ day of May, 2006. 
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Brett D. Cragun 
Douglas L. Stowell 
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